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JUDICIAL ACCELERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS: THE RIGHT TO RELIEF FROM
UNDULY PROTRACTED PROCEEDINGS*
A RECENT decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding in
part a district court order enjoining the Regional Director of the National
Labor Relations Board from proceeding with certain further hearings ordered
by the NLRB, raises the problem whether unduly protracted hearings warrant
immediate judicial review notwithstanding the general policy of judicial non-
intervention during the course of administrative proceedings. This case, Decr-
ing Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston,' dramatizes a frequently criticized aspect of the
administrative process: the slow, cumbersome, and costly manner in which
cases are adjudicated. 2 Ironically, the desire to achieve an efficient and prompt
enforcement of many of our laws was a major motive for extending the scope
of the administrative process. 8 Despite this objective, it is almost universally
acknowledged that excessive delay is a striking characteristic of administrative
proceedings today. As Judge Prettyman has stated, "[Presently] the American
businessman or labor leader... [is putting up] with processes which do not
function with the accuracy and expedition which he requires for his working
purposes. .. ."4 The hardships of such delay on parties to administrative pro-
ceedings have frequently been demonstrated. 5 But many instances of delay, re-
*Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
1. 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
2. Prettyman, Reducing the Delay in Administrative Hearings, 39 A.B.A.J. 966 (1953).
With this delay has come an increased loss of confidence in, and an increase in public ap-
prehension toward, administrative government. With only few exceptions, a party to an
administrative proceeding has no assurance that he will receive that degree of justice in
accordance with law which he expects and usually receives from the courts. See Oulahau,
Reforming the Administrative Process: A Challenge to the American Bar, 51 BRIFv 101
(1956).
3. James M. Landis, a former dean of the Harvard Law School who served as a mem-
ber of the Federal Trade Commission and Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, ob-
served that the hope and confidence which initially surrounded the administrative process
anticipated that "it would supplant in some respect the costliness [and delay] of litigation
in our courts." Landis, The Administrative Process: The Third Decade, 47 A,B.A.J. 135,
138 (1961). See also an address of Stuart Rothman, General Counsel of the NLRB, in
which he stated:
[O]ne of the principle [sic] reasons the administration of certain laws was taken from
the courts and placed in the bands of ... administrative agencies ... wag because
the processes of the courts had become too cumbersome and time consuming....
Address by Stuart Rothman, "Time and Tide in Taft-Hartley," Jan. 8, 1960, reported in
45 L.R-R.M. 86, 89 (1960).
4. Judge Prettyman goes on to comment that not only will these groups not put up with
such delay-waiting years for a decision which could be reached in weeks-but will also
not "indefinitely permit disputed issues to be buried in an ocean sand of irrelevancies and
thus lost instead of being decided." Prettyman, supra note 2, at 966.
5. See Oulahan, supra note 2.
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gardless of its effects on the parties, are not susceptible to judicial solution.
Thus, for instance, crowded dockets resulting from inadequate appropriations
and a lack of personnel demand solutions uniquely available to the Congress
or the agencies themselves.6 Courts may, however, deal with certain causes of
delay by enjoining or requiring an administrative decision. 7 Thus, courts can
be responsive to the excessive admission of evidence in a particular case or to
an unreasonable refusal by an agency to decide a case before it.s However,
judicial relief from the burdens of delay, whatever the cause of such delay,
necessarily presupposes intervention in administrative proceedings before the
administrative process has fully run its course.
The controversy in Deering Milliken began when Darlington discontinued
its operations, discharged its employees, and went into liquidation o immediate-
ly after the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) received a major-
ity of the employees' votes in a representative election at the Darlington
Manufacturing Company. Hearings began in January 1957 on the Union's
charge against Darlington that the shutdown constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice ;1o at these hearings the Union sought to present evidence to establish that
Darlington's operation, including its labor relations policy, was controlled by
Deering Milliken, Darlington's sales representative, and that, therefore, Deer-
ing Milliken should be held responsible for the alleged unfair labor practice."
This evidence was rejected as outside the scope of the complaint, and after
several months of hearings, the Trial Examiner concluded that Darlington had
committed unfair labor practices.- Since Darlington's cessation of business
was in part attributable to economic motives, the Examiner recommended that
the Board's order not contain the traditional remedy requiring reinstatement and
reimbursement of lost wages.'3 On review, the Board remanded the case and
6. Many agencies have attempted to correct their internal problems themselves. Ac-
cording to Philip Elman, Federal Trade Commissioner, "the administrative agencies are
[presently] engaged in critical self-appraisal and internal reform.... [T]ask forces and
ad hoc committees are busily drafting reorganization, plans, revising rules of practice,
streamlining procedures, etc." Address by Commissioner Elman, Federal Bar Association
Annual Convention, Sept. 13, 1961.
7. See note 49 infra and accompanying text.
8. Landis, supra note 3, at 139.
9. Brief for Appellant, p. 3, Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F2d 856 (4th Cir.
1961).
10. The unfair labor charge was brought pursuant to §§ 8(a) (1), (3) and (5) of the
NLRA on the basis that Darlington had closed its mill and gone into liquidation "in order
to discourage union membership and to evade its obligation to bargain with the Union.....
Id. at 4.
11. 295 F.2d 856, 858 (4th Cir. 1961).
12. Ibid.
13. Brief for Appellant, p. 4, Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F2d 856 (4th
Cir. 1961). On October 17, 1962 the NLRB, in a 3 to 2 ruling, reversed the Trial Examiner
and ordered Darlington "to pay back wages to the discharged employees until they could
obtain equivalent jobs, or until they are either put to work at an affiliated mill or put on
a preferential hiring list for such employment." It also ruled that Deering Milliken was
equally liable for the back pay and that it must reinstate the discharged workers if the
1963]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ordered the Trial Examiner to hear evidence on TWUA's charge that Darling-
ton was controlled by Deering Milliken.14 During the next ten months, exten-
sive evidence was taken at the remand hearing. In December 1959, more than
a year after the remand hearings had closed, the Trial Examiner, noting that
much time and effort had been fruitlessly expended,1r submitted a Supplemental
Intermediate Report rejecting the Union's claim of a single employer status
between Darlington and Deering Milliken, and recommended dismissal of
the complaint against Deering Milliken.'0 The case again came before the
Board, but no action was taken until January 1961, over three years after the
first remand order. The Board granted a motion of TWUA for a second
remand to the Trial Examiner on the basis of newly discovered evidence relat-
ing to the alleged single employer status.l 7 The remand order, however, was
not limited to consideration of the newly discovered evidence but also required
further hearings and testimony covering
(2) the responsibility of Deering, Milliken & Co., Inc., either for the un-
fair labor practices of Darlington Manufacturing Company or to remedy
those unfair labor practices and (3) such further evidence as may be
deemed proper and appropriate under the circumstances.1 8
Darlington mill is reopened. If it is not, they must be offered the first available jobs at the
other mills held to be under Deering Milliken's control and Milliken is to pay all moving
expenses of such employees. Darlington Mfg. Co., 51 L.R.R.M. 1278 (1962).
14. 295 F.2d 856, 858 (4th Cir. 1961).
15. The Trial Examiner observed at the conclusion of the remand, "We have indeed
labored but have brought forth not even a mouse." Id. at 859.
16. Ibid. Every opportunity was given TWUA to prove Deering Millikcn's responsi-
bility for Darlington's labor policy. Even at the conclusion of the remand hearings, at the
request of the General Counsel, the record was held open in order that he and TWUA
might review the evidence to make sure that sufficient available evidence to support the
union's theory of a unitary organization had been offered. After the requested period had
passed without any effort on the part of the General Counsel or the union to offer additional
or supplemental evidence, the record was closed. Ibid.
17. Ibid. The basis for this remand order was a public announcement by Decring Mil-
liken that it had appointed a president for each of its three manufacturing divisions. (The
three manufacturing divisions were its fine goods division, its worsted division, and its
woolen division. It is to be noted that Darlington, a print cloth mill, did not fall into ay
of these three categories.) The union contended that this announcement was inconsistent
with the company's earlier contention that it was not engaged in manufacturing activities
since many of the particular mills listed in the three divisions were found in the earlier
hearings not to be under the control of Deering Milliken. Thus, the union argued (not
knowing the existence of these "manufacturing divisions" prior to the newspaper reports),
there was sufficient newly discovered evidence to reopen the case. See Brief for Appellant,
pp. 7-8, Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). Deering Milliken
objected to the second remand on the basis that the events suggested by the press releases
occurred four years after the Darlington mill had closed and furthermore that the announce-
ment followed a merger of Deering Milliken with Cotwool Manufacturing Company. See
Brief for Appellee, pp. 12-14.
18. 295 F.2d 856, 860 (4th Cir. 1961). It is to be noted that during the hearings of the
previous remand there had been prolonged and extensive consideration of the supplemental
question of possible remedies in the event an unfair labor practice should be found to have
been committed. Id. at 858.
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At this point Deering Milliken sued in the district court to enjoin the re-
mand, asserting that the Board's action constituted an unreasonable delay in
violation of sections 6(a) and 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The district court, in granting the injunction, held that the new hearings would
cover issues already extensively considered and that the excessive delay would
cause plaintiff irreparable injury.19 The Fourth Circuit, relying in part on the
Administrative Procedure Act, upheld the jurisdiction of the district court to
intervene but modified the injunction to allow further hearings respecting the
newly discovered evidence. The court stated that:
the remainder of the Board's remand order is so unspecific and broad that
it lends justification to the fears of the plaintiff... that hearings lasting
weeks and months and costing many thousands of dollars, may be required
to replow the same ground covered in the hearings on the first remand.
This, we think would impose undue additional delay in the light of the
overly long pendency of these proceedings already, amounting to a failure
to bring these proceedings to a conclusion with reasonable dispatch. To
the extent, therefore, that the order of the District Court prohibits further
hearings on the second remand directed to the issue occasioning the first
remand, or any other unspecific matter, we think the District Court's action
was justified by the record. ̂
Deering Milliken represents the first instance in which a court in dealing
with the problem of delay has relied upon section 6(a) of the APA, requiring
generally that agencies proceed with reasonable dispatch.2 ' It also represents
one of those exceptional situations where a court has reviewed agency action
during the course of administrative proceedings. In deciding whether a court
should make such a determination, and, if so, under what circumstances, it is
necessary to consider not only section 6(a) and its legislative history but also
the rationale and scope of the long established judicial policy of avoiding pre-
mature review of agency action.
The insistence of courts upon timeliness of review is designed primarily to
avoid premature review of administrative action and is based upon considera-
tions of economy and a recognition of the proper role of courts in their relation-
ship with the administrative process. By limiting review to "final" orders, courts
protect both the parties and agencies from the additional financial burdens of
piecemeal review, and preserve the time and efforts of the judiciary for other
matters. Even more important, it is believed that premature review of agency
action would encroach upon the policy making functions of administrative
agencies.22 Administrative agencies, having the benefits of specialization and
19. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 193 F. Supp. 741, 744 (M.D.N.C. 1961).
20. 295 F.2d 856, 869 (4th Cir. 1961).
21. Administrative Procedure Act § 6(a), 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a)
(1958). This provision of § 6(a) includes the words "except that due regard shall be had
for the convenience and necessity of the parties or their representatives."
22. Professor Davis defines the administrative agency as "a governmental authority,
other than a court and other than a legislative body, which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rule making." 1 DAvis, Axmms ,rvxA LAw
TREATiSE § 1.01 (1958). The power of adjudication to which Davis refers is legislative in
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expertise and possessing broad investigatory powers,23 have greater capacity
and competence than courts to administer complicated regulatory legislation.
Thus, there are considerable broad areas of delegated administrative discretion
over which judicial review is limited.24 If courts intervene too early, the exer-
cise of informed discretion and thus the advantages of the administrative proc-
ess may be partially or completely foregone. For example, where a court
decides that certain evidence should be excluded prior to a decision on the
merits by the agency, not only is the outcome of a particular agency action
likely to be affected but also such a decision itself necessitates a familiarity
with the nature of the proceedings and the relationship of the evidence to it.
A third reason for judicial nonintervention is the awareness that, if agencies
are to play a responsible role in the administration of public policy, it will be
necessary for them to work out many of their own problems by having the
freedom to make and correct their own mistakes.2 These considerations are
generally subsumed under the related, overlapping doctrines of ripeness, ex-
haustion, and finality, which govern the relationship between courts and other
governmental institutions generally. 26 The requirement of ripeness is based
nature and, to this extent, the agency is an initial policy maker. If a court prematurely
reviews a controversy pending before an agency, it incorrectly usurps the agency's func-
tion.
23. Under its investigatory powers an, agency has the power to subpoena witnesses and
records. In short, the agency is an institution capable of performing in an area that the
courts were not intended to enter. See Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540
(1946), and Comment, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 2 RAcr REL. L. Rnt,.
561 (1957).
24. Section 10 of the APA which deals with judicial review is modified by the intro-
ductory clause "Except so far as ... agency action is by law committed to agency discre-
tion. .. ." For a discussion of action committed by law to agency discretion see 4 DAvis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATIsE § 28.16 (1958).
25. Brandeis suggested this idea when he stated that "Responsibility is the great de-
veloper of men." St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 92 (1936)
(concurring opinion). Only with responsibility and a reasonable opportunity to correct its
owvn errors will the administrative tribunal develop into the functional body it was en-
visioned to be. As Judge Friendly observed in a lecture at Harvard, "the best agency to
improve agency performance is the agency itself." Quoted in Address by Philip Elnian,
First Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Northwestern University School of Law, Oct.
11, 1962.
26. Both ripeness and exhaustion are part of the basic doctrine of the final order rule.
This doctrine of finality is analogous to the policy against piece-meal review found in the
judicial system, and is based on the common policy of avoiding constant delays in. the
course of proceedings by reviewing mere procedural requirements of interlocutory char-
acter. See note 69 infra. The doctrine of ripeness was applied in Federal Power Comnmis-
sion v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375 (1938). In that case, the Supreme Court
reversed a decree of the circuit court of appeals restraining the FPC from proceeding
with an investigation of Metropolitan's affairs until it disposed of objections to its juris-
diction raised by the latter's petition for a rehearing. The commission had granted the
petition for a rehearing but had proceeded to hear evidence on other issues without ruling
on it. The Court, finding that the question was premature and thus that the court of appeals
was without jurisdiction to issue the decree, said that permitting judicial review of inter-
mediate administrative orders would afford an "opportunity for constant delays in the course
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upon the principle that the judicial system should decide real or present rather
than abstract or hypothetical issues and thus focuses upon the presence or
imminence of harm to the complaining party from the government action. -?
The exhaustion doctrine requires that a party have exhausted all the channels
in the administrative process which might provide a remedy for his alleged in-
jury and thus focuses upon whether something remains for resolution by the
agency.2 Finality requires that there be a final decision rather than a tentative
determination by the agency.29 Each of these doctrines relates to the problem
of whether a petitioner seeking judicial assistance has prematurely resorted to
the courts, and allows the courts to await the completion of the administrative
process before reviewing alleged errors.
The application of these doctrines in any particular case is rendered uncer-
tain by the fact that countervailing considerations may outweigh those that
mitigate against early review of administrative action. The most important con-
of the administrative proceeding." Id. at 383. Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351
U.S. 40 (1956) and United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
The doctrine of exhaustion, as part of the doctrine of finality, is exemplified by Na-
tional Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Here the plaintiff, a
national bar association, brought suit to contest the Attorney General's proposal to desig-
nate plaintiff as a communist dominated organization. The court held in the absence of a
showing of impending irreparable injury flowing from the delay incident to a pursuit of
administrative remedies, the plaintiff must first exhaust those remedies available. But see
Leedom v. International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, 352 U.S. 145 (1956).
27. Although both ripeness and exhaustion- relate to the proper timing of review--
when do you insert the court-ripeness focuses "upon the types of functions that courts
should perform.' 3 DAvis, ADMmISTRAT=V LAW TREATiSE § 21.01 (1958). It is this type
of problem, raising issues of institutional capability, rather than that of exhaustion of
remedies, which has most relevance to Deering Milliken and the problem of delay.
28. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not gain general recog-
nition until 1908 in the case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1903).
The case which has become a classic in, the field of exhaustion, however, is the later decision
of Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). The Mycrs case arose
when Bethlehem brought a bill in equity against the NLRB to enjoin it from holding a
hearing on a complaint issued by the Board against Bethlehem. The district court granted
the injunction and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Brandeis, reversed, however, referring to "the long settled rule of judicial adminis-
tration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until
the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Id. at 50-51. This doctrine of
exhaustion was well stated by the Court in Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch,
331 U.S. 752 (1947). The plaintiff there sued for a declaratory judgment that the Re-
negotiation Acts were unconstitutional and for an injunction against the continuation of
proceedings under these acts then pending in the Tax Court. The suit vas held premature
on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court stated at 767:
The very purpose of providing either an exclusive or an initial and preliminary
administrative determination is to secure the administrative judgment either, in the
one case, in substitution for judicial decision or, in the other, as foundation for or
perchance to make unnecessary later judicial proceedings.
29. See, e.g., Eastern Utilities Associates v. SEC, 162 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1947) ; Cana-
dian River Gas Co. v. FPC, 110 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1940), cert. denicd, 311 U.S. 693
(1940). See also 4 DAvis, op. cit. mipra note 24, at § 28.12.
1963]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sideration here, of course, is the injury to a party resulting from denial of re-
view at a particular time. Thus, where the jurisdiction of an agency to take a
particular action may fairly be said to be in doubt and the jurisdictional ques-
tion is based upon considerations that are not within the ambit of the agency's
peculiar competence, courts have decided this issue before completion of the
administrative proceedings.80 Similarly, where the agency clearly does not have
the authority to grant the relief sought by the petitioner or to conduct an in-
vestigation, courts have granted immediate relief.31 Another instance of early
review is where the constitutionality of a provision of the statute administered
by the agency is challenged. 32 Here, however, other considerations, such as the
possibility that the agency action will avoid the necessity of a constitutional
decision or at least change the posture of the constitutional issue, may preclude
review before the completion of the agency proceedings. 33 Courts will also gen-
30. In the case of Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 9 N.J. 477, 89 A.2d 13 (1952) (per Vanderbilt,
C.J.), the court specifically refused to follow the Myers doctrine of exhaustion and allowed
review. In a suit by the Boulevard Commissioners to compel defendant Board to raise the
total amount of the plaintiff's requisition, the court noted that
[In an earlier case] we recognized two exceptions in the interest of justice to the
rule of exhaustion of remedies, the first where the jurisdiction of the statutory
tribunal was questioned on persuasive grounds and the second where the statutory
tribunal had jurisdiction but the charges asserted before it were so palpably defective
that its jurisdiction was merely colorable.
Id. at 486, 89 A.2d at 17. The court also went on to say that "the only result of requiring al
exhaustion of administrative remedies where only a question of law is in issue would be
useless delay, and this in the interest of justice cannot be countenanced." Id. at 487, 89 A.2d
at 17.
31. See, e.g., Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Board of Co. Comm., 247 U.S. 282 (1918);
Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918).
32. The most notable exception, to finality is probably where questions of constitution-
ality arise either as to the action of the administrative agency or as to the statute under
which the agency works. There is, however, no clearcut line of demarcation in the cases to
indicate when challenges to the constitutionality of statutes or of the agency action itself
will be considered initially by the court without prior agency action. An example of a case
which was reviewed before administrative action was complete is Parker v. Lester, 112
F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953), a case involving six merchant seamen who argued that the
power of the Commandant of the Coast Guard to exclude seamen from employment on
merchant vessels for "security reasons" was unconstitutional because it denied due process
of law. The court stated that "no special familiarity with complicated factual situations is
necessary for the granting of relief; no administrative expertese [sic] conies into play,
The issue, here, is one wholly of law. In short, the policy considerations which underlie
judicial forbearance are inapplicable." Id. at 440. An example, however, of a case in which
a constitutional issue was raised unsuccessfully in what has been called "the current trend"
is Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954). In this case a complaint was
filed by the Wage Stabilization Board under the Defense Production Act. The action was
challenged on the ground that the provisions of the act were unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court declined to consider the challenge saying "it would be premature action on our part
to rule upon... [it] until after the required administrative procedures have been exhausted."
Id. at 553.
33. In the case where a party challenges action on the grounds that it is unconstitu-
tional, the court is caught between the desire to correct the constitutional defect at the
[Vol. 72:574
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erally review where the action of the agency is such that unless a claim is im-
mediately reviewed a party will suffer irreparable injury, i.e., no procedure is
made available within the agency by which immediate and effective review and
relief can be granted.8 4
The question of irreparable injury can be viewed in terms of whether, rather
than when, relief will be granted. Since the alleged imminent injury is usually
one which is not compensable, review must be granted immediately to avoid
what may be an unjust deprivation. In Cohmbia Broadcasting Company v.
United States,35 for example, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to review of a Federal Communication Commission regulation which,
if applied, would deny a license to any broadcasting company which entered
into certain defined types of contracts with any broadcasting networks. CBS
claimed that this regulation would adversely affect its contractual relationships
with broadcasting stations. The Court, per Chief Justice Stone, found that
irreparable injury would be caused to CBS from "wholesale cancellation of its
contracts," and that review of the order by the FCC would not be adequate,
since such a proceeding "if ever instituted, which is uncertain... would come
earliest point with the often prevailing desire not to decide constitutional issues unless
absolutely necessary. See, e.g., Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 238 (1936). See also Bic-el,
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HAnv. L. Rzv. 40
(1961).
34. See, e.g., Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 201 F.2d 334 (1st Cir. 1953).
Algonquin applied for and received a certificate necessary to construct a pipe line system.
It had nearly finished construction when the Court of Appeals, to which a competitor of
Algonquin had petitioned for review of the order granting the certificate, vacated the order
and remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings. Algonquin then applied
to the Commission for a temporary certificate. This request was denied. At this point Al-
gonquin brought a petition for review of the Commissioner's order denying the certificate
for lack of jurisdiction. The First Circuit held it should be reviewed. If it were not, the
court noted, the question would be moot. See also Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. FPC, 201
F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1953). For a general discussion of review in cases where the adminis-
trative action has not been completed see Davis, Administrative Remedies Often Need Not
be Exhausted, 19 F.R.D. 437 (1957).
35. 316 U.S. 407 (1942). A similar result was reached by the court in Levers v. An-
derson, 326 U.S. 219 (1945), where the plaintiff's permit to operate a wholesale liquor
business was annulled by the Alcohol Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiff's appeal from the order of annulment because
it had not applied to the Commissioner for reconsideration as was permitted by the Treasury
Regulations. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the Myers rule did not auto-
matically require that judicial review must be denied where rehearing was authorized but
not sought. In reversing, the Court said that it is not necessary to observe "mere formalities
which waste the time of litigants and tribunals, tend unnecessarily to prolong the adminis-
trative process, and delay or embarrass enforcement of orders which have all the charac-
teristics of finality essential to appealable orders." Id. at 222.
This case was followed by a more lenient attitude by the courts where review was
sought. The rule that one must exhaust his administrative remedies before he is entitled
to judicial review was no longer held to operate automatically where relief is e.-'pressly
permitted by statute. This flexible approach has since been labeled the "discretionary ap-
proach." See Comment, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 2 RAcE R. L. RrP.
561, 564-65 (1957).
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too late to save appellant from the injury wrought by the outlawry of its con-
tracts."3 6 "The ultimate test of reviewability," the Court continued, "is not to
be found in an overrefined technique, but in the need of the review to protect
from the irreparable injury threatened in the exceptional case by administrative
rulings which attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other
hearings and adjudications that may follow, the results of which the regulation
purports to control. 37 Other instances in which threatened irreparable injury
has justified immediate judicial review are where an agency has granted or
denied a motion to change the time or place of the hearing on grounds of
"forum non conveniens"'3 s and where an agency has demanded disclosure of
information over the objection of a party that such information is privileged
or confidential. 39
36. 316 U.S. 407, 423-24 (1942).
37. Id. at 425.
38. See Jeffries v. Olesen, 121 F. Supp. 463 (S.D. Cal. 1954), a "forum non con-
veniens" case, where the court held that the Post Office Department denied due process by
holding a hearing in Washington instead of in Los Angeles. The court stated that "It Is
equally shocking to learn that an administrative tribunal has so disregarded the necessity
and convenience of a party defendant in an administrative proceeding." Id. at 476.
Compare, however, Eastern Utilities Association v. SEC, 162 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1947),
where Eastern Utilities, the plaintiff, sought to move the SEC hearing from Philadelphia
to Boston, because the offices of the witness for the hearing and the stockholders of Eastern
were in Boston. Although the situation was such that the injury sought to be avoided
would be irreparable if the case were not reviewed at this point, the court refused to review.
Professor Davis characterized this situation as follows:
No matter what a court in reviewing a final order might think of the Commission's
order denying a change in the place of hearing, the Court would be powerless to
restore to the petitioner the expense and inconvenience of attending tile hearing in
Philadelphia. The result was therefore a total denial of review on the issue of the
place of the hearing.
Davis, mtpra note 34, at 465.
39. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (violated privilege against
self-incrimination) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (subpoena is unduly vague or ui-
reasonably burdensome). For a more complete discussion, of the role of the court in pro-
ceedings to enforce administrative demands of disclosure of information, see Brief for the
Respondent, pp. 17-18, Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943) as quoted
in GELLHORN & BYSE, ADMINisTRATVE LAW 579 (1960). See also 1 DAvis, op. cit. supra
note 22, at §§ 3.11-.12.
Still another situation in which courts have found irreparable injury is exemplified by
Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1954), ecrt. denied, 347 U.S. 990
(1954). The case concerned an association of eighteen common carrier steamship lines,
which had agreed that any shipper who refused to use conference lines exclusively would be
charged rates higher than those who agreed. Isbrandtsen, the only non-member line con-
peting with the conference vessels, immediately filed a complaint with the Federal Maritime
Board. The Board, without hearing, issued an order permitting dual rate systems ten-
porarily, and denied Isbrandtsen's request for an immediate hearing. At this point Isbrandt.
sen appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals which allowed review, stating that the
Board, by its actions
virtually removed Isbrandtsen from the shipping market involved. Whether this
removal was temporary or permanent, Isbrandtsen would inevitably suffer "real,




Most of the cases of irreparable injury justifying immediate judicial relief
present peculiar fact situations and thus few generalizations about when review
is available can be derived from them. However, against this background of
case law, it can be seen that inordinate delay, as exemplified by Decring Mil-
liken, provides a new illustration of irreparable injury which can occur unless
a court grants immediate review. The injury a party must bear as a result of
delay may be viewed in terms of cost, since numerous costs are directly related
to the length of a judicial or administrative proceeding 40 Perhaps the most
substantial cost is produced by the process of litigation itself.4 ' The number of
man-hours of lawyers, executives, technicians, mid other corporate employees
participating in a hearing can entail incredibly high costs. Another significant
cost resulting from delay is due to the continuing uncertainty as to the outcome
of the case. The possibility of an unliquidated financial liability may adversely
affect the credit position of a corporation during the litigation as well as the
market price of its stock.4 And where liability continues to accrue daily dur-
ing the course of the litigation, as in the Dcering Milliken case, the absence
of a final determination prevents a party from mitigating his loss.4 3
Although any delay in administrative proceedings imposes these costs upon
a party, a judicial determination to relieve a party of such hardships in a par-
ticular case must rest upon a consideration of the cause of delay and the effect
relief will have upon the proper functioning of the administrative process. De-
lay in administrative proceedings may take either the form of an endless series
of hearings without a final decision 4 or a refusal by an agency to act on
40. Landis, supra note 3.
41. If the NLRB found Deering Milliken responsible for the unfair labor violation (as
it ultimately did, supra note 13) the corporation would have been liable for potential back-
pay liability accruing at a rate in excess of $100,000 a month. Brief for Appellee, p. 46.
Without doubt this affects not only the credit position of Deering Milliken, especially
through its effect on the stock value, but also, if a liability reserve is created, the book value
and reported income.
42. Deering Milliken's liability because of the six year delay in the final determination
of the unfair labor charge is expected to "run- into the millions of dollars." Charlotte News,
Oct. 19, 1962, p. 1-B, cols. 1-2.
43. In the Deering Milliken case, for example, the defendants had, preparatory to the
hearings on the first remand, made available for inspection 10,000 pages of records and
documents, of which 2600 pages were selected by the General Counsel for further analysis.
Fourteen witnesses testified, over 400 pages of exhibits were introduced, and over 2500 pages
of testimony taken. The cost and expense of making available just one of these exhibits was
alleged to have required nearly 400 manhours of work by employees of Deering Milliken.
295 F2d 856, 858 (4th Cir. 1961). This cost to Deering Milliken would have been sub-
stantially augmented by the second remand where it was estimated that it would require
approximately an additional 62,000 pages of testimony and 13,000 pages of exhibits. Brief
for Appellee, p. 45.
The cost of consuming the time of regular employees, it can be noted, can be measured
either in terms of the direct outlay for employees' services or the return from alternative
employment which the corporation must forego.
44. Delay which is characterized by an endless series of hearings results from one of
two causes. One such cause is where a party in a superior position is deliberately stalling
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a matter before it.45 When the latter form of delay results from a lack of
adequate resources, courts should be extremely reluctant to order an agency to
decide a particular case.46 Granting such relief to one litigant will necessarily
cause further delay for others. But where an agency refuses to decide a par-
ticular case for some other reason 47 or for no reason at all, relief in the form
of a mandatory injunction would seem appropriate. 48 Indeed, the Supreme
Court, in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,49 held that the refusal of a state
public ultilities commission to decide the company's request for a rate change
justified the intervention of a federal court to enjoin the enforcement of pre-
viously established, and allegedly confiscatory, rates.50 The problem of whether
because delay works to his advantage. Thus it has been noted by Judge Prettyman, supra
note 2, at 970, that
Inexplicable delays and expense are due to the wily lawyer with a weak case rather
than the incompetence of counsel. The former is attempting to create all possible
confusion so as to delay to the bitter utmost the inevitable bad tidings.
There is some hint by the Fourth Circuit that such may have been the case in Deering
Milliken: "[h]ere the Union has asked for additional hearings and could hardly complain
of the resulting delay but the employer has not asked for them and is entitled to question
their reasonableness." 295 F.2d 856, 868 (4th Cir. 1961).
A second cause of this type of delay is where the administrative agency is unduly slow
and cumbersome in its proceeding. Such was the case in Deering Milliken where the supple-
mental issues covered by the second remand, had previously been extensively prepared and
tried in a protracted hearing, lasting over two years. Id. at 858.
45. See, e.g., Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 607 (1944), a suit for
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act, where the Court required the Wage and Hour
Administrator to promulgate his definition of "area of production" under the act, a definition
which was crucial to the issue in the case. The Court noted that the district court would
not be telling the administrator how to exercise his discretion, but would merely require
him to exercise it, noting that this was a judicial remedy against inaction. See International
Ry. Co. v. Prendergast, 52 F.2d 293 (1930).
46. See note 6 sitpra and accompanying text.
47. It has even been suggested by one commentator that "delay is a weapon which can
be, and has been, used by an agency to exhaust private parties." Oulahan, supra note 2, at
120.
48. The power of a court to grant injunctive relief against an agency where there is a
showing of great or irreparable injury has been successfully invoked on general equitable
principles in a number of cases. In American Federation of Labor v. Madden, 33 F. Supp.
943 (D.D.C. 1940), for example, a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdic-
tion, was overruled by the court which held that a sufficient showing of great and irreparable
injury had been made to sustain an independent suit in equity. See also, Farmer v. United
Electrical Workers, 211 F2d 36 (D.D.C. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 943 and Klein v.
Herrick, 41 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
49. 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
50. In the Smith case the Court noted that "the commission, for a period of two years,
remained practically dormant; and nothing in the circumstances suggests that it had any
intention of going further with the matter." Id. at 591. The Supreme Court, in holding that
petitioner was entitled to judicial review, stated further, that
For this apparent neglect on. the part of the commission, no reason or excuse has
been given; and it is just to say that, without explanation, its conduct evincep an
entire lack of that acute appreciation of justice which should characterize a tribunal
charged with the delicate and important duty of regulating the rates of a public
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delay results from an overcrowded docket or from wilfulness on the part of an
agency is not present where delay takes the form of unduly slow and cumber-
some procedures. Here, however, courts must consider the possibility of in-
fringement upon agency discretion. Agencies have traditionally been vested
with considerable discretion to determine their own evidentiary and procedural
rules.51 The complex, specialized type of findings which must often be made in
administrative hearings strongly suggests that courts continue to grant con-
siderable deference to agency procedures and refrain from automatically apply-
ing to agencies the traditional standards used in invalidating delay in judicial
proceedings.52 Thus, ordinarily an agency decision to take further evidence on
an issue already considered should prevail, for such a determination will fre-
quently involve that specialized competence which an agency is presumed to
possess.5 3 But these considerations underlying nonintervention do not ineluct-
ably outweigh the interests of a party subjected to burdensome extensive pro-
ceedings. Where an agency continues hearings to the point where they appear
"repetitive, purposeless and oppressive,"' r the burden should be on the agency
utility with fairness to its patrons, but with a hand quick to preserve it from con-
fiscation. Property may be as effectively taken by long-continued and unreasonable
delay in putting an end to confiscatory rates as by an express affirmance of them;
and where, in that respect, such a state of facts is disclosed as we have here, the
injured public service company is not required indefinitely to await a decision of the
rate-making tribunal before applying to a federal court for equitable relief.
Id. at 591-92.
51. The adjudicatory procedures of the administrative agencies stem primarily from
their own made rules and customs. See § 3(a) of the APA, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a) (1958). There is no basic procedural pattern which all agencies follow and the
role of the courts in the formulation, of administrative procedure is limited to situations of
abuse of this discretion; generally the enforcement of constitutional and statutory require-
ments. See 1 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 22, at §§ 8.01-.03, and Federal Communications
Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940), the often cited decision
that courts must not transplant judicial practices to the administrative process.
52. The difficulty in applying a set of mechanical rules of -when to and when not to
intervene in the administrative process was recognized by the court in Deering Milliken.
It said that
There are no absolute standards by which it may be determined whether a proceeding
is being advanced with reasonable dispatch. What is reasonable can be decided only
in the light of the nature of the proceedings and the general and specific problems of
the agency in discharging its functions and duties.
295 F.2d 856, 867 (4th Cir. 1961). This same conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court
in Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950). The Court said in speak-
ing of the mixed precedent on the subject of the finality of decrees:
This lamentation is equally fitting to describe the intervening struggle of the courts;
sometimes to devise a formula that will encompass all situations and at other times
to take hardship cases out from under the rigidity of previous declarations; some-
times choosing one and sometimes another of the considerations that always compete
in the question of appealability, the most important of which are the inconvenience
and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice by
delay on the other.
338 U.S. at 511.
53. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
54. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 868 (4th Cir. 1961).
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to adduce a reason for taking evidence on an issue already heard or for order-
ing further hearings on such issues. Thus the Court of Appeals in Deering Mil-
liken seems correct in reversing the district court and allowing a hearing on
newly discovered evidence and prohibiting new hearings on issues that were
already heard.55 Except for the discovery of new evidence, the agency offered
no explanation to justify its broad remand order.50 It is true that in making
this type of determination the court substitutes its judgment for that of the
agency. But this would not seem beyond the proper scope of the judicial proc-
ess, since the question when agency procedures unduly infringe upon private
rights concerns those broader aspects of the legal order for which courts are
primarily responsible.
57
Authority for curtailing the Board's remand order in Deering Milliken was
found in section 6(a) of the APA, which provides that "Every agency shall
proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it except
that due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties or
their representatives."5 8 The use of section 6(a) is significant, for prior to
Deering Milliken it had not been used as the basis for an injunction, 0 although
one court had stated in a strong dictum that section 6(a) could be enforced by
a "mandatory injunction." 0° Courts have, however, cited this provision to meet
55. Ibid.
56. Id. at 860.
57. For a discussion of the types of legal questions which courts make and the prob-
lem of the substitution of judicial judgment see 4 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 24, at §§ 30.01-
.06.
58. 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958).
59. Not only has § 6(a) not been used by the courts for enjoining unduly protracted
proceedings but it has not even been, used by the agencies to guarantee a party caught in
the administrative process a hearing with dispatch. Illustrative is a decision of the Civil
Aeronautics Board in National Airlincs, Inc., Mail Rates, 18 C.A.B. 442 (1954). Here the
Bureau Counsel of the CAB appealed from an order permitting evidence on the question
of whether there had been unjustified or unwarranted delay in processing National's mail-
rate petition. National argued that § 6(a) of the APA, when violated by dilatory if not
deliberate delay, and § 406 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, which empowers the Board to
"fix and determine a fair and reasonable rate of mail compensation," when read together,
authorize the Board, on the basis of delay, to set its final rate at an earlier date than nor-
mal. The Board rejected this argument saying that "section 406 of the Civil Aeronautics
Act may not be used directly or indirectly as a means of redress for violations of section 6
of the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. at 444. To this conclusion came the following
words of dissent:
[T]he majority decision [is] ... in, error on the following grounds:
1. It violates the spirit and intent as well as the letter of the Administrative
Procedure Act which was designed to protect the rights of litigants against undue
or unwarranted delay in administrative proceedings.
2. The effect of the majority decision is to place National Airlines (and any
other carrier who may now or in the future be in a similarly unenviable position)
with no remedy for possible Board misfeasance in its mail-rate program,
3. The majority decision is contrary to sound public policy.
Id. at 445.
60. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Donovan, 274 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1960). The
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a party's contention that an agency proceeded with excessive haste. 1 But, as
one commentator has characterized section 6 (a), "Few provisions of [the APA ]
have proved more useless in securing speedy and fair administrative justice."'3 -
The legislative history of section 6(a) is ambiguous as to whether it requires
agencies to avoid delay resulting from prolonged proceedings. The House Com-
mittee Report states:
The requirement that agencies proceed "with reasonable dispatch to con-
clude any matter presented" means that no agency shall in effect deny re-
lief or fail to conclude a case by mere inaction, or proceed in dilatory fashion
to the injury of the persons concerned. No agency should permit any per-
son to suffer consequences of unwarranted official delay.0
court in a proceeding to require a deputy commission to proceed to a decision in a matter
properly before him under the Longshoremen's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901-40
(1958), reversed the district court holding that the Longshoremen's Act imposed a duty
to hold a suitable hearing to pass upon and adjudicate all complaints raised. It went on to
note in dictum that:
The APA provides categorically that "every agency shall proceed with reasonable
dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it. .. ." Apparently in recognition that
a failure or refusal to hear and decide could be as destructive as bad deciding, Con-
gress provided in § 10(e) that Courts may review the inaction of an agency and
specifically "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."
And enforcement may be by a mandatory injunction.
Id. at 802.
61. Dolcin Corp. v. FTC, 219 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1954). This was a review of a cease
and desist order of the FTC. The petitioners were engaged in the manufacture of a drug
"Doldn!' designed primarily to relieve the symptoms of arthritis and rheumatism. Dolcin
made far-reaching claims which resulted in an FTC complaint. After extensive hearings
the trial eamminer found Dolcin's claim uniwarranted. In affirming this decision the review-
ing court remarked:
It may be that petitioners were in some degree prejudiced by the course the Com-
mission took: their oral argument was delivered under the handicap of a fresh
precedent rendered on the same medical evidence. But administrative agencies are
under congressional mandate to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any
matter presented. . .
Id. at 746.
62. Oulahan supra note 2, at 120. This observation is substantiated by a number of
cases which have arisen since the passage of the APA where delay was crucial but instead
of finding relief for the complaining parties under the APA federal courts have intervened
and compelled action on the basis of "general equitable principles." One such case is
American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1951), an appeal from two
orders of the FCC granting special service authorization to a broadcasting company. In
compelling the FCC to finish proceedings which had been pending for six years, the Court
of Appeals stated:
[O]n occasion the courts must act to make certain that what can be done is done.
Agency inaction can be as harmful as wrong action. The Commission cannot, by its
delay, substantially nullify rights which the [Federal Communication] Act confers
Id. at 501. See also, Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, 356 U.S. 309, 318 (1958) and Addi-
son v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
63. Senate Comm. on judiciary, Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History,
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1946) (emphasis added).
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This statement clearly indicates that action as well as inaction could constitute
"unwarranted official delay." But the Senate Committee Report states that "the
requirement, that agencies proceed 'with reasonable dispatch to conclude any
matter presented' is a statement of legal requirement that no agency shall in
effect deny relief or fail to conclude a case by a mere inaction."04 This language
is reasonably subject to the interpretation that the provision addressed itself
exclusively to requiring the agency to order hearings, or, following hearings,
to render a decision within a reasonable time.
Such an interpretation seems erroneous, however. In construing the scope
of section 6(a), it should be read in conjunction with section 10 of the act,
which involves the type of administrative action that is reviewable and the
scope of judicial review. Section 10(a) grants the right of review to "any per-
son suffering legal wrong because of any agency action. . . .", Section 10(c)
states that "every final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in any court is subject to judicial review."00, Both the Senate and I-louse
reports state that " 'Final' action includes any effective agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in any court."0 7 This reading of the word
"final" seems appropriate in light of the judicial application of the finality con-
cept before the enactment of the APA and the implications of other provisions
of the APA relating to finality. As observed above, courts have found agency
action to be "final" where such action threatens a party with imminent injury
which would be irremediable at a later proceeding. Furthermore, section 10
(e) (A) requires a court to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or un-
reasonably delayed" ;68 if the definition of "final agency action" under section
10(c) were limited to ultimate termination of agency proceedings, courts could
never take the action authorized in section 10(e). Thus, "final agency action" for
purposes of entitling a party to review must include any agency behavior which
irreparably injures a party. 0 The power to review agency action necessarily
64. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 205 (1946).
65. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1958).
66. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1958).
67. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 213, 277 (1946). The House Report adds the
adjective "operative" so that the statement reads "effective or operative agency action.
This addition, however, does not change the meaning.
68. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (A) (1958).
69. The conclusion that Congress intended "final agency action" to entitle a party to
review when injured by unreasonable delay is strengthened when the statutes governing
similar problems within the federal judicial system are examined. In the judicial proceetq,
as in the administrative process, there is an, historic policy, whether at law or equity, for
finality in court proceedings before an appeal is allowed. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has
observed in noting the policy behind finality:
Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate
procedure. It was written, into the first Judiciary Act and has been departed from
only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all.
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940). See 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
ff 54.04, at 22 (2d ed. 1953).
This policy of federal appellate review is presently embodied in Federal Rule 54, the
final judgment rule. There is, however, a competing principle or qualification to prac-
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implies the power to reverse, modify, or set aside aspects of such action which
violate an applicable legal rule or principle of justice. Thus, unduly prolonged
proceedings, as well as an agency refusal to act, is subject to judicial invalida-
tion. Once it is recognized that lengthy administrative proceedings are subject
to review, the broad standard for invalidating agency action can be found in
section 10(e) which requires courts to compel agency action unreasonably de-
layed and to set aside agency action "found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law ... [or] without
observance of procedure required by law."70 Thus, it need not be argued that
section 6(a) specifically confers upon a private party a right to compel an
agency to "proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented
to it.. .,171 for section 10 of the APA provides sufficient authority to enjoin
or compel agency action for the protection of private parties. In determining
whether action is "unreasonably delayed," "arbitrary," and not "in accordance
with law,"72 however, the general duty imposed upon agencies under section
6(a) clearly seems relevant.
tically every judicial principle of finality our court system has. 6 MooRF, FEDEAL% PrAcricE
ff 54.04, at 23 (2d ed. 1953). Such qualifications come in the form of prerogative vits, now
combined in the All Writs Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1651), which have been necessary to give
the system the flexibility it needs in exceptional situations where appellate review would
not be available under either the statutes governing interlocutory appeals (28 U.S.C. § 1292)
or those governing appeals from final judgments (28 U.S.C. § 1291). The purpose of this
statute is to enable an appellate court to review a decision by an appropriate prerogative
writ, when the claims of the individual case that justice demands a present review outweigh
the general policy which confines appeals to final orders. Determining when circumstances
justify immediate review, as in the administrative process, is a problem of balancing. Miere
inconvenience or the expense that will result from a postponed review is usually not sufficient
to warrant the issuance of a writ. Where extreme hardship or questions which do not lend
themselves to decision on appeal from a final judgment at a later time because the issue
will be moot or the complaining party irreparably injured, are involved, however, review
is usually permitted. Id. at 71. Forum non conveniens is one such example and, to quote
Professor Moore, so is the situation where review will be postponed because of an order
for a new trial following "perhaps a long and expensive second trial... ."6 foo., FEnRAl.
PRacricE ff 59.15[2], at 3901 (2d ed. 1953). Although there are many basic differences
between the administrative process and the judicial system it is accurate to say that if the
Deering Milliken situation were transposed to the federal courts, an appellate court could
assume jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction was assumed a federal appellate court, under the gen-
eral supervisory power that it has over lower federal courts, could circumscribe the action
of the trial court in the case of inordinate delay. From this result it may be argued that
since Congress gave the federal courts the power to remedy the type of problem found in
-Deering Milliken, in reviewing other courts, it intended the "final agency action" of § 10(c)
of the APA to grant similar powers in the area of administrative process.
70. 60 Stat 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (B) (1958).
71. 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958).
72. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958).
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